Postjournalism and news sourcing: supplying opinions instead of news
Postjournalism insulated the media in their ideological filter bubbles, including their bubbles of experts
As journalism mutated into postjournalism, news supply has morphed into news validation. The shift has entailed multiple professional rearrangements. One of the most profound and least noticeable was the change in the structure and nature of news sourcing. Essentially, reporting was replaced by commenting. Reporters have learned to express attitude under the guise of reporting. Also, a new media function has emerged and swelled: news commentators and experts, employed by the media on different occasions. The shift was not political—it was ecological. Reed more in Postjournalism and the death of newspapers. The media after Trump: manufacturing anger and polarization.
According to Herman and Chomsky, “The mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest” (Herman & Chomsky, 2002 [1988], p. 18).
The media cannot afford to have correspondents everywhere something might happen. They must rely on other networks through which important information circulates—the bureaucratic networks of government and corporations. The information supplied by these bureaucracies has economic value, as it would cost the media a great deal to obtain equivalent information, particularly from overseas, on their own.
Governmental and corporate sources are typically regarded as recognizable and credible in their respective domains. If not from them, where else would society obtain vital information about national and foreign policies and affairs? Bureaucracies not only provide but also produce information of high importance, which makes them the primary—and often exclusive—sources of crucial information.
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Herman and Chomsky highlighted the scale on which government and corporate bureaucracies produced public information, often specifically aimed at the media. By 1988, the Pentagon had a public information service with many thousands of employees. The US Air Force alone revealed that its public information outreach included the following:
· 140 newspapers, 690,000 copies per week
· Airman magazine, monthly circulation 125,000
· 34 radio and 17 TV stations, primarily overseas
· 45,000 headquarters and unit news releases
· 615,000 hometown news releases
· 6,600 interviews with news media
· 3,200 news conferences
· 500 news media orientation flights
· 50 meetings with editorial boards
· 11,000 speeches. (Herman & Chomsky, 2002 [1988], p. 20.)
This governmental and corporate information mega-machine unavoidably became an important link in the supply chain of media production. Herman and Chomsky wrote that,
In effect, the large bureaucracies of the powerful subsidize the mass media, and gain special access by their contribution to reducing the media’s costs of acquiring the raw materials of, and producing, news. The large entities that provide this subsidy become “routine” news sources and have privileged access to the gates. Non-routine sources must struggle for access, and may be ignored by the arbitrary decision of the gatekeepers. (Herman & Chomsky, 2002 [1988], p. 22.)
As a result, the media became affiliated with—and dependent on—the government and corporate sources and narratives they produced. If journalists bite the hand that feeds them, they can be punished with a subsequent refusal of access, giving their competitors an advantage. As Herman and Chomsky stated,
For the media, these “professional” relationships of news sourcing carry the political effect of acquiring a pre-adjusted narrative and the economic value of a bribe. Controlled sourcing is a structural factor that creates “economic necessity and reciprocity of interest” between the media and elites.
Herman and Chomsky’s view of the media–elite-as-news-source symbiosis was sometimes criticized, for example, for not taking newsroom autonomy into account. For many journalists, it is a matter of professional honor not to rely solely on official or corporate sources and to treat them critically, even agonistically.
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Since Herman and Chomsky introduced their model, two major shifts in the media have reshaped the nature and structure of news sourcing. First, the media moved from ad revenue to reader revenue. Second, they shifted from journalism of fact to opinion journalism. These shifts drove three key changes in news sourcing:
1) Decline of bureaucratic sourcing. The importance of “raw materials” and bureaucracies as sources has decreased, while content curation and expertise have gained prominence.
2) Rise of expert sourcing. The structure of the expert cohort in the media has changed. In addition to experts in economics, politics, military, security, and foreign affairs, more academics in liberal studies and experts with activist backgrounds have joined, as opinions have become more sought after than facts.
3) Polarization of sourcing. Reader-revenue-driven polarization has fostered opposing expert filter bubbles, further intensifying division.
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Decline of bureaucratic sourcing. When society becomes more polarized, bureaucracy loses its status as an objective and unbiased primary source. With higher polarization, partisanship becomes all-pervading, infiltrating both bureaucracy and its relationship with society and the media.
Another factor that weakened the bureaucracy’s role in news sourcing is the internet. It undermined the exclusivity of government and corporate bureaucracies over information from distant regions or closed institutions. For example, during Chomsky’s criticism of US military policy, journalists could obtain information about overseas military operations almost only by collaborating with the military. Now, any journalist can reach out to locals, bypass official filters, and obtain alternative information. Moreover, such information “from the ground” often reaches journalists on its own.
The same applies to all closed and secret structures: the internet has created an environment that encourages leaks and bypassing official filters.
Herman and Chomsky argued that government and corporate bureaucracies subsidized the media by supplying news, as it was too costly to have correspondents everywhere. They were right—at the time. Now, however, it costs almost nothing to obtain evidence from anywhere via the internet and social media. As a result, bureaucracies now subsidize spam, most evident in their press releases. <…>
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The divorce between the media and bureaucracy as a news source has, however, a flip side for the media: the bureaucracy no longer needs the media as much as it once did. The internet has emancipated authorship for everyone, including those in power, who can now communicate with the public directly. They have all the technological means to be the media themselves. Read: “Obama, the coolest president ever!” How Obama broke the Propaganda Model.
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Rise of expert sourcing. Since the introduction of the Propaganda Model, the media has completed its reversal from journalism of fact to opinion journalism. The focus of news sourcing has shifted from raw facts to expertise and guidance through already-known news.<…>
In the 21st century, with the rise of the digital economy—an economy of knowledge—expertise and the ability to navigate information have become crucial for individuals, organizations, and society. Responding to this demand, expertise became part of the media and even a genre of journalism alongside traditional reporting. Prominent experts often even sidelined celebrities and politicians in the ranks of special guests and columnists.
Herman and Chomsky noted the influence of experts in international security, terrorism, and defense issues at the time. Another cohort of experts was patronized by corporations interested in promoting consumerism and depoliticization.
Since then, however, the structure of the expert cohort affiliated with the media has changed. Experts with backgrounds in the military and security have kept their positions but are now concentrated mainly in the conservative media. The liberal media have broadened their range of experts by recruiting intellectuals with backgrounds in the humanities and critical studies of all kinds. They were not in such demand in the times of manufacturing consent; now they are.
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Besides the wide range of bloggers and commentators promoted to experts, another rich niche for expert recruitment has emerged—activism.
Activism can bolster one’s reputation and publicity. Publicity, in turn, improves activism by raising awareness. This dynamic fits the principle of validating significance through dissemination: once an activist gains some reputation, their publicity confirms their significance, alongside the personal qualities naturally required for success in activism.
With declining trust in institutions, the role and number of classical experts will shrink, while expert-activists will grow in prominence. Experts made from activism also serve the media’s need for polarization well. Navigation in a turbulent news environment involves not just rational assessment—in fact, rational assessment least of all—but emotional evaluation and the moral framing of what is right and wrong. This is moral expertise. People often need guidance on which aspects of current events are appealing and which are appalling, according to a shared system of values. For this purpose, experts with activist backgrounds are especially suited, as they are allowed, and often expected, to impose moral guidelines.
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Polarization of news sourcing. The donating audience increases pressure on newsrooms regarding which experts should not be given a platform. The Twitterati often furiously condemn newsrooms for choosing the “wrong” authors, commentators, or experts.
Flak from the donating audience narrows the newsroom’s choice of experts and commentators to carriers of “politically correct” views on both sides. (Read: Bari Weiss and Postjournalism.) The need to spark the audience’s emotions to rally behind the cause incentivizes the media to involve more “ardent” experts.
Technically, experts cannot be “ardent”; if they are, they are likely propagandists. As media recruitment has shifted toward opinion makers, the tone of expertise has moved from balanced considerations toward political and moral judgment. This shift serves the media’s need to solicit subscriptions as donations. It also fosters the formation of expert filter bubbles—circles of regular experts clustered around politicized media brands. Even seemingly apolitical topics, such as mask-wearing, have been polarized and politically weaponized.
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The cocooning of the media within their expert filter bubbles is invisibly yet powerfully reinforced by new technical capabilities for feedback measurement.
In the past, editors packaged content in large bundles, including the set of experts, commentators, and columnists chosen for an issue. While audiences might have had preferences for certain authors or experts, reactions were generally broad and aimed at the entire package—and they came with a delay. This lag gave editors the freedom to maneuver and balance, allowing them the luxury of viewing an edition as a whole, with elements complementing and balancing each other.
This changed with the quantization of content on the internet and social media. Any unit of content can now be perceived individually and instantly, and reactions to it can be registered just as quickly. Clicks, likes, shares, comments, and Twitter backlash have become tools for the audience to exert immediate pressure on a newsroom’s choice of experts and commentators.
The editor instantly sees what the audience likes or hates, with hate being more visible due to the higher value factor of “negativity bias.” As fear of grassroots flak grows, editors are increasingly pushed to avoid authors and commentators who carry a high risk of provoking a negative reaction.
As Glenn Greenwald described it in regard to TV,
…cable news programs are constructed to feed their audiences only self-affirming narratives that vindicate partisan loyalties. One liberal cable host told me that they receive ratings not for each show but for each segment, and they can see the ratings drop off—the remotes clicking away—if they put on the air anyone who criticizes the party to which that outlet is devoted (Democrats in the case of MSNBC and CNN, the GOP in the case of Fox).[i]
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Eli Pariser, who coined the term “filter bubble,” identified the adaptation of news supply to audience reactions as a key prerequisite for such bubbles. He compared the newsroom of Gawker—the then-skyrocketing online tabloid of the late 2000s—with that of The New York Times. In Gawker’s newsroom, a “Big Board” displayed the top posts by page views. “Write an article that makes it onto the Big Board, and you’re liable to get a raise,” Pariser noted. “Stay off it for too long, and you may need to find a different job” (Pariser, 2011, p. 32).
The New York Times at the time took the opposite stance, disregarding the audience’s immediate reactions. Pariser saw this as an advantage, even a mark of journalism’s dignity. Here is his account:
At the New York Times, reporters and bloggers aren’t allowed to see how many people click on their stories. This isn’t just a rule, it’s a philosophy that the Times lives by: The point of being the newspaper of record is to provide readers with the benefit of excellent, considered editorial judgment. “We don’t let metrics dictate our assignments and play,” New York Times editor Bill Keller said, “because we believe readers come to us for our judgment, not the judgment of the crowd. We’re not ‘American Idol.’” Readers can vote with their feet by subscribing to another paper if they like, but the Times doesn’t pander. Younger Times writers who are concerned about such things have to essentially bribe the paper’s system administrators to give them a peek at their stats. (The paper does use aggregate statistics to determine which online features to expand or cut.) (Pariser, 2011, p. 32.)
The editor of a newspaper funded mainly by advertising could afford to say, “Readers can vote with their feet by subscribing to another paper if they like.” The editor of a paper dependent solely on reader revenue cannot.
After the reversal from ad revenue to reader revenue, the balance between “our judgment” and “the judgment of the crowd,” as NYT editor Bill Keller called it, has reversed as well. By 2020, just a decade later, “our judgment” could no longer risk straying too far from “the judgment of the crowd” voiced on Twitter. “We’re not ‘American Idol’” went the same way as “We are not resistance”—into the past. Such mottos no longer fit a media business built on soliciting subscriptions as donations. Journalism surrenders each new “We are not…”.
Some might be tempted to blame the leadership of The New York Times for this surrender, as the “paper of record” has perhaps suffered from it the most. But these are environmental conditions, not anyone’s fault.
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This environmental and irresistible force insulates the media in their ideological filter bubbles, including their bubbles of experts. The experts orbiting each media outlet gradually become a set of speakers, pre-approved by the donating audience—more precisely, by the most vocal part of that audience.
The political cocooning of expert selection is just half of the problem. The other half concerns the amplification of extremes and the suppression of centrist views. Centrist experts can appear in the media, but they are not the ones who generate buzz, virality, and spin-offs in a polarized environment aimed at agitating the donating audience. Moderate stances do not work well in this market. This business model aggressively eliminates undesired opinions and passively disincentivizes moderate and centrist ones.
Reed more in Postjournalism and the death of newspapers. The media after Trump: manufacturing anger and polarization.
See also books by Andrey Mir:
The Viral Inquisitor and other essays on postjournalism and media ecology (2024)
Digital Future in the Rearview Mirror: Jaspers’ Axial Age and Logan’s Alphabet Effect (2024)
[i] Greenwald, Glenn. (2020, May 18). “Ben Smith’s NYT critique of Ronan Farrow describes a toxic, corrosive, and still-vibrant Trump-Era pathology: “Resistance Journalism”.” The Intercept.